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Identities身份认同 Identités 
 
 “Chinese Identity” as a Problem 
 WANG BIN 
 
 
Cet article s’interroge sur les problèmes de langage lors de l’évocation d’une identité 
chinoise. Préconisant une approche culturelle relativiste, il s’oppose à une conception 
totalisatrice de l’identité qui rechercherait l’authentique dans l’intemporel. Se basant 
sur les usages différents de mots représentant la Chine et les Chinois dans des 
langues diverses, Wang Bing démontre que l’on ne peut exprimer de manière formelle 
la réalité complexe de l’identité collective chinoise.  
 
 
Not long ago I got involved in a transcultural programme called “Keyword 
Project”. Each word, if presumed to be a key expression across conceptual 
boundaries between different linguistic-cultural communities, was to be explored 
separately in six articles by six contributors coming from six areas: China, India, 
America, France, Africa and the Arab world. The contributors were supposed to 
write in their own respective native languages. It was hoped that the project might 
help to create a shared platform where we could see how a more or less identical 
mental conception works in different linguistic contexts and consequently 
contributes to structuring or re-structuring their respective lifeworlds (Lebenswelt). 
For the benefit of “quality control”, however, all non-English presentations were to 
be translated into English first and, after their acceptance, from English into other 
languages for local publication. I was asked to focus on the term “identity” and to 
translate my own writing into English. 
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Identity as a key word immediately confronts me with a series of identity problems, 
epistemological as well as ethical in nature. First, I do not believe there exists 
something like “Chinese identity” which could transcend spatio-temporal limits 
and therefore apply to all those who happen to move in the world under the name 
“Chinese”. Secondly, as a transcendental signified motivated by a metaphysical 
desire or postulated for effective ideological manipulation, Chinese has manifested 
itself in various substitutes in the history of our intellectual/social/political life. 
They include Confucianism, the Kingdom of all kingdoms, Mr. Science and Mr. 
Democracy (the slogan of the May 4th 1919 movement), the proletariat, the Party, the 
people, tradition, socialist market economy, etc.. Different as they are in content, all 
these integrating forces have one thing in common: collective orientation. And this 
gives rise to another epistemological and ethical problem. No collective identity can 
exist in and of itself. It is always pronounced by empirical individual speakers in 
specific contexts and situations for specific purposes. Put otherwise, a certain 
society’s self-image or cultural identity is always a biased ideology proclaimed by 
those who have vested interests in some human/social relationships and power 
over other relationships, though it often goes by the name of “nation”, “country”, 
“religion”, “culture”, “the people”, etc.. The collective, in this sense, is silent and 
absent. Blind to the commonplace, one falls a prey to ideological manipulations. 
This problem of mine sounds very much like philosophical and moral relativism, 
which constitutes a new problem in terms of identification. Now, politicians, both 
in the West and in the east, have accepted the idea of cultural pluralism. But, 
insistence on cultural relativity may not only support the weak in their struggle 
against the invasion from what is called western normative imperialism. It can also 
disarm the legitimate challenge from abroad and even justify illegitimate, local 
authoritarianism by stressing cultural differences. This paradoxical nature of 
cultural relativism puts me in another dilemma when I try to locate what has 
caused terrorist attacks, the international/transcultural background against which I 
was considering the composition of my article about identity. In the light of cultural 
relativity, it is extremely difficult to make an either/or choice between Islamic 
fundamentalism and western value norms. It does not follow, however, that we 
should go back to essentialism or universalism. The terrorist attack is a wrong 
solution to the problem of the confrontation between diverse cultural identities, 
while the “War against Terrorism” cannot automatically remove the problem itself. 
It was with all these problems in mind that I managed to present an article under 
the title of “Identity as a Transcultural Problem”. 
 
 




My deconstruction of the notion of collective identity disappoints my French 
collaborators. I can have some sympathy with this reaction: a collective French or 
European identity is indispensable in their competition with the American drive for 
cultural hegemony. Then, they project their own desire for a holistic cultural 
identity onto their expectations of other people’s self-image presentation and 
suggest that I should tell the European reader what authentic Chinese identity is. 
The stress is on the term “Chinese”. In a modified version of my paper I try to 
explain the linguistic reason for my hesitation in talking about Chinese identity. 
This additional part to the article might be interesting to both European and 
Chinese native speakers. 
 
There exist several parallel expressions in Chinese that are significantly distinctive 
but homologized, through translation, into one English concept: “Chinese”. First, 
there exist two expressions with respect to language: 汉语 (Hanyu, literally “Han 
language”) and 中国话 (Zhongguohua, literally “China speech”). Hanyu refers to a 
language (yu) whose native speakers are called Han or Han people. By the way, I 
happen to be one of them. It consists of many dialects, some of which are mutually 
unintelligible in the spoken form but which share a single system of writing. Oral 
communication is impossible between two Chinese persons if one speaks 
Cantonese and the other Shanghai dialect. Put otherwise, if only in terms of the 
spoken form, Hanyu, a language used by over one billion people, does not really 
exist! To integrate all the incommensurable speech characteristics into an abstract 
totality defined as Chinese is a metaphysical desire or a linguistic ideal alien to the 
wisdom manifest in Confucianism or Taoism or Chinese Buddhism. Zhongguohua is 
the so-called standard language of the Chinese based on Peking dialect. It is the 
official speech of the People’s Republic of China, and, strictly speaking, is not a 
natural language in terms of modern linguistics.  
 
The problem looms larger when one comes to another pair of concepts correlating, 
within the Chinese language, with the first one (that is, Hanyu/Zhongguohua). They 
are 汉族人 (Hanzuren, meaning “Han people”) and 中国人 (Zhongguoren, meaning 
“people of China”). A Han person can speak Zhongguohua (“China’s speech”, that is 
the standard Chinese based on Peking speech) if he/she is more or less educated. A 
Zhongguoren (one of the “people of China”) may not be able to speak “China’s 
speech” if he/she is from one of the many ethnic minorities. A native of Tibet is a 
Zhongguoren, though he/she is not a Han person: his/her non-Chinese native 
language has nothing to do with his/her political/national identity as one of the 
“people of China”. When it comes to English, the above subtle but important 
distinctions suddenly disappear. In English, “Chinese” is actually referring to the 
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Han language (Hanyu) when it is used to designate a language, automatically 
separating it from “Tibetan” and many other languages used by “people of China” 
whose native languages are not Chinese. The problem is that “Chinese” in English 
also means “a native of China or a descendent of the people of China” and, by 
working as an adjective, “of China, its people, language, or culture.” (Webster’s New 
World Dictionary, second edition.) The three senses are interrelated and cannot be 
separated semantically and hence politically. In the “prison-house” of the English 
language, one has to differentiate “Chinese” from “Tibetan” in the three senses 
altogether. It does not make a distinction between “Han people” which exclude 
Tibetans, on the one hand, and on the other “people of China”, which include both 
Han people and Tibetans. I dare to guess that Westerners as a whole share an 
identical inclination with respect to what “the Chinese” includes and what is does 
not. With all this in mind, the political implication of discussing the Chinese 
identity in English would be a welcome surprise to those who advocate the 
independence of Tibet but a shock to all the people of China. By analogy, one may 
well ask: are we supposed to ask a native of Scotland to represent something like 
the English identity which could help to differentiate people of the United 
Kingdom from all the others? This is a ridiculous question even at the linguistic 
level. It is easy to rectify the error, if one still insists on the idea of the collective in 
question, by changing “English” to “British”. Unfortunately, English as a system of 
signs denies to us (both Han and non-Han people in China) what it gives to its own 
people in Britain. Here is a problem of linguistic politics without a solution to 
which a discussion about Chinese identity would be dangerously confusing and 
confused. 
 
A third pair of conceptions is created by the overseas Chinese: 中国文化 (Zhongguo 
wenhua, “Chinese culture”) and 华人文化  (Huaren wenhua, “Chinese people 
culture”). The separation sounds strange in English but proves important in 
Chinese. Those who live outside China and, most probably, are passport holders of 
any country except China, identify themselves with Chinese people’s culture. They 
designate the people of China as belonging to the culture of China. This bifurcation 
of Chinese culture, so to speak, helps the overseas Chinese to identify themselves 
with and, at the same time, differentiate themselves from what is generally called in 
English “Chinese culture”. On the other hand, it also facilitates the retention of 
Chinese tradition among Chinese communities throughout the world when they 
are faced with undesirable cultural assimilation in various foreign lands. A positive 
result would be a symbiosis through acculturation in a specific foreign country. It 
explains in part why Chinese communities abroad like to talk about Chinese 
identity and why they seem more patriotic than the citizens of the People’s Republic 




of China. The political motivation behind the two distinct but correlated 
conceptions comes to light when intellectuals from both sides—“China culture” 
and “Chinese people culture”—agree on a new theme: cultural China as a bigger 
country. It attempts to integrate all kinds of Chinese culture both at home and 
abroad. Without any critical reflection, it might forge a certain kind of solidarity. As 
for the meaning of Chinese identity, it cannot help us much. 
 
Last but not least is the Japanese expression for “Chinese/China” and the Chinese 
reaction to it. Two years ago, an international conference on comparative literature 
and culture was held in Guangzhou (Canton) during which something unexpected 
happened. Shigemi Inaga, my personal friend for many years and an outstanding 
scholar from the International Research Center for Japanese Studies, Kyoto, Japan, 
came to me for help. He wanted me to explain to a Chinese professor from Peking 
the European counterparts of the Japanese words Shina and Shinajin. I stayed two 
years in Italy and have intellectual contacts in France. With my limited knowledge 
of European languages, I told my fellow-countryman that Shina corresponds to 
China, Chine (French) and Cina (Italian), while Shinajin to Chinese, Chinois and 
Cinese. Etymologically they are related to one another and it is said that Shina 
originates from Sanskrit. But I am not an expert in diachronic linguistics, and Mr. 
Shigemi Inaga knows that very well. “What is going to happen?” I asked myself. 
The Chinese professor said: “I don’t care about that! I only know that we don’t 
accept the term ‘Shina’ or ‘Shinajin’!” My Japanese friend retorted, “Why do you 
make allowance for Europeans and let them go on with those expressions?” I 
immediately realized what had happened between them. Shina and Shinajin were 
adopted by the Japanese in the middle of 18th century but became expressions of 
racial discrimination during the Second World War. The bitter memory is still fresh 
in the minds of the Chinese, even though many Japanese contemporaries like 
Shigemi Inaga do not use the two words in a pejorative way. As a result, the 
Japanese resort to a double linguistic/political policy: for the benefit of 
communication between China and Japan, any Japanese documents sent to the 
Chinese, either official or academic or commercial, must avoid those two 
undesirable signifiers. They have to depend on the Japanese kana to create another 
two words whose pronunciation sounds like the Chinese word 中国(Zhongguo, 
that is, China). It is obligatory, because any written material containing “Shina” or 
“Shinajin” will be rejected by the Chinese side. But, on the other hand, the Japanese 
continue to use the controversial terms both at home and abroad as long as the 
communication does not involve the Chinese. Then, a discussion between the 
Japanese and the Europeans about “Chinese identity” will inevitably take Shina and 
Shinajin as neutral equivalents of China/Chine/Cina and Chinese/Chinois/Cinese. 
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Ironically, this would surely trigger off an identity problem on the part of the 
Chinese at a transcultural level. Personally speaking, I am not that sensitive. The 
derogatory connotation in Shina and Shinajin is a product of history. It is their actual 
meanings in the contemporary system of Japanese discourse, not the Chinese 
reaction, that determine their legitimacy or illegitimacy in the final analysis. 
Politically correct or incorrect in the field of cross-cultural communication is one 
thing; that the meaning of a word depends on its native speakers for explanation is 
quite another. The problem with the English expression “Chinese”, I hold, is much 
bigger. It is deep-rooted and still taken for granted.  
 
Now I can sum up my argument. I refuse to discuss “Chinese identity”, not merely 
because we have had our own bitter experiences of the collective self-identity (the 
nation, the people, the proletariat, the Party, and so on, a series of 
political/ideological substitutes introduced from abroad) but mainly because the 
rule of the English language has already prescribed the meaning of “Chinese” in 
advance. As a mode of structuring, it shapes Reality into one meaningful world, 
among many other linguistically-shaped worlds, for English native speakers. The 
Chinese always remains the Other. Its semantic underpinnings reflect a western 
desire for constructing this Other according to the rules and needs on the part of the 
Self. To discuss Chinese identity in English, and it is the same in any other 
European languages, will result in anything but Chinese. Of course, the explanation 
of the impossibility of representing Chinese identity might have already suggested 
something Chinese. But, this “something”, as I have demonstrated in the above 
critique of the word Chinese or Shinajin, is not purely Chinese but cross-linguistic 
and intercultural.  
 
 
